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Is Aid for Trade Effective?
Introduction
Aid for Trade (AfT) became a buzz word in aid policy only a few years ago, but is far from being a new concept in development policy (Evenett, 2009) . Dating back to the [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] Uruguay Round, developing countries began demanding financial compensation for concessions made in trade liberalization negotiations 2 as well as an increase in development aid to help facilitate integration into the world trading system. Aid that serves the latter objective is usually considered AfT. As trade liberalization negotiations became more difficult in the late 1990s and early 2000s given that the "easier" concessions had already been made on both sides (developed and developing countries), WTO members separated the AfT initiative from the Doha Round negotiations and established a WTO 'Aid for Trade Task Force' in July 2006. According to the WTO task force on AfT, " [AfT] is about assisting developing countries to increase exports of goods and services, to integrate into the multilateral trading system, and to benefit from liberalised trade and increased market access. Effective [AfT] will enhance growth prospects and reduce poverty, as well as complement multilateral trade reforms and distribute the global benefits more equitably across and within developing countries." (Cited in OECD/WTO, 2011: 9.) In essence, the objectives of the AfT initiative were to promote growth and development through trade across developing countries, especially in the least developed countries (LDCs); and through their integration into the world trading system. This was to be achieved through more trade-related infrastructure, developing greater production capacity and capabilities and by supporting negotiations concerning trade policy regulation and trade liberalization. As AfT is considered an important instrument of development aid, the European Union, the United States, and Japan made non-binding concessions to increase AfT disbursements. However, the means 3 for AfT have not increased substantially (García, 2008; Luke, 2009; Huchet-Bourdon et al., 2009; Karingi, 2009 . In the period from 2002 to 2009, AfT ranged from a meager 20 to 30% of total official development assistance (ODA) . While AfT increased during these years, other types of aid increased even faster (Karingi, 2009) . In Africa, the AfT share shrank from 29% in 2002 to 21% in 2006. In real terms, 2010 AfT commitments were extremely high at US$ 48 billion, declining by 14 percent to US$ 41 billion in 2011. Meanwhile, AfT disbursements were less affected by the 2011 decline in ODA; disbursements declined only by 3.7% to US$ 33.5 billion (see Figure A .1).
In recent years, development economists have become more aware of the challenges of overall ODA in promoting trade and economic growth in developing countries (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Nowak-Lehmann D. et al., 2012; Nowak-Lehmann D. et al., 2013) . Many existing studies find that ODA is ineffective, in that it no significant impact on per capita income and recipient country exports. However, these studies fail to differentiate 3 among different types of aid, such as: AfT, technical assistance, humanitarian aid, sector-specific aid, etc. This could explain why the authors were unable to find a positive impact of aid.
Given the objectives of AfT, our question remains: Is AfT effective? In particular, we investigate whether AfT is associated with higher exports of goods and services. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature on AfT-effectiveness is scarce, as pointed out by Vijil and Wagner (2012) , and most of the work consists of case studies at the country level.
The effectiveness of AfT is currently assessed using one of two approaches. The first approach investigates whether AfT reduces the cost of trading or other impediments to trade.
The second approach, which is used in this paper, analyses whether AfT is associated with improved export performance (measured by the value of exports of goods and services). Most existing studies have found a positive relationship between AfT or some of its components, and 4 trade-related outcomes. Among these studies, Bearce et al. (2013) find that AfT issued by the US government has a positive effect on the recipient country's export performance; Vijil and Wagner (2012) suggest that aid to trade-related infrastructure 4 , as part of overall AfT, has a positive impact on exports as a ratio to GDP; and Cali and Te Velde (2011: 725) find that AfT has an overall positive and significant effect on exports and also lowers trade costs. Both Vijil and Wagner (2012) and Cali and Te Velde (2011) emphasize that the infrastructure channel is the main driver of AfT effectiveness. However, Helble, Mann and Wilson (2012) find that aid for trade policy and regulations (which is another AfT category) is also effective. The authors find that a 1% increase in aid towards trade policy and regulation increases trade volume by around US$ 347 million. Hühne et al. (2013) have investigated the impact of AfT on both donor and recipient countries. Regarding recipient countries, they find total AfT and its components (infrastructure-related aid, aid for building and improving productive capacity and aid for trade policy and regulation) to be effective. However, when splitting the sample into groups, by income and region, the results become mixed. AfT tends to favor richer developing countries and countries in Asia and Latin America.
The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is our approach in taking a closer look at the mixed results. To do this, we use a methodology, panel-quantile regression, which allows us to investigate whether AfT has a different effect for different quantiles of the distribution of exports, and thus, favors countries that already possess certain export advantages. This is an important step in trying to investigate whether AfT is only fostering exports for countries that have already developed some exporting capacity.
The main results show that AfT disbursements promote exports of goods and services mainly for the .50 and .75 quantiles of the conditional distribution of exports. However, this effect essentially vanishes for some types of AfT at the lower tail of the distribution. Hence, countries that export more also benefit more than other countries from AfT. In particular, aid 5 used to build production capacity is found to be effective. This type of AfT is associated with higher exports for all quantiles but the first, with the effect increasing at the upper tail of the conditional distribution. Also, aid used to build infrastructure is found to positively affect exports at the upper tail of the distribution. In contrast, aid for trade policy and regulations; and aid disbursed to general budget support (for comparison), which is considered as an untargeted component of aid, are not associated with higher exports. This holds true irrespective of the quantile.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model that we use to analyse AfT effectiveness. Section 3 discusses the variables, data and descriptive statistics.
Regression results are presented and evaluated in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Model

Baseline model
As a framework for analysis, we estimate the model proposed by Cali and Te Velde (2011) using the most recent AfT data. The authors identify the types of AfT that can help address governance failures in developing countries by associating the main aid categories, as classified by the OECD statistics, with a number of goals that are related to trade performance, e.g. aid for trade policy and regulations should improve weak institutions. They also refer to the complexity of the economic channels through which AfT affects export performance. This includes Dutch disease effects as well as direct and indirect competitiveness effects. The authors claim, however, that causality is less complex than for the aid-economic growth link. The OECD distinguishes between five categories of AfT: (1) technical assistance for trade policy and regulations (e.g. helping countries develop trade strategies, negotiating trade agreements and implementing their outcomes); (2) trade-related infrastructure (e.g. building roads, ports and telecommunication networks to connect domestic markets to the global economy); (OECD, 2014) . For reasons of data availability, we limit our analysis to the first three categories of AfT.
The empirical model used to analyse AfT effectiveness is an export demand equation augmented with aid for trade variables and is given by,
where Exp it denotes exports of country i in year t, X kit variables are observed explanatory (such as AfT) and control variables, D lt variables are time dummies and Ɛ it is the error term. However with a (pooled) OLS regression as in (1) we are not controlling for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. To capture these unobserved effects, the model is specified as,
where α i denotes country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and Ɛ it is the error term. The unobserved effect α i is country-specific and time-invariant and can be treated as fixed or random to fit the model. The baseline is the following static unobserved effects model,
in which ln denotes natural logs. We regress exports (Exp it ) on lagged proxies for AfT (AfT hit-x ) while controlling for population size (POP it ), market potential (MP it ), government effectiveness 7 (GE it ) and the consumer price index (CPI it ). Furthermore, time dummies (D lt ) and the countryunobserved effects (α i ) are included.
Model (3) is a generalized version of the model used by Cali and Te Velde (2011: 730) .
The main differences are twofold. First, we use exports of goods and services as a dependent variable, whereas the authors use merchandise exports. Second, the authors use only two proxies of AfT, while we consider three.
The reasons for our choice of dependent and explanatory variables are as follow. First, there is no reason to limit the scope of analysis to merchandise exports. Service exports, for example, could also be fostered by AfT. AfT is neither aimed at merchandise exports only nor would we expect the export performance of service sectors to be unaffected by AfT. 5 Consequently, we use exports of goods and services as the dependent variable in our regressions. Second, when analysing the effect of AfT on exports, a specific measure of AfT must be selected (i.e. selecting which AfT categories to include in the estimations). Cali and Te Velde (2011) use aid disbursed for economic infrastructure and aid disbursed to production capacity. In contrast to their study, we make use of three AfT proxies: aid to trade policies and regulation (TPR), aid to economic infrastructure (EI) and aid to building production capacity (BPC). Our choice of AfT proxies allows us to avoid an omitted variable bias that could be present when only two AfT categories are used. To give one example example, aid disbursed to TPR-which is omitted in Cali and Te Velde (2011)-has, say, a positive effect on exports, as found by Helble, Mann and Wilson, (2012) and is positively correlated with, for instance, aid disbursed to EI (which is included in their regressions), then the effect of aid disbursed to EI would be overestimated.
To put our results into perspective, we compare the impact of AfT with the impact of aid to general budget support (GBS), which might be used by recipients for trade development but 8 which is not counted as AfT. Lastly, we experiment with three alternative measures of market potential. The concept of market potential dates back to Harris (1954) . Cali and Te Velde (2011: 730) calculate the market potential 6 of country i at time t as the sum of the (inverse) bilateral distance (d ij ) weighted GDPs of all other countries, i.e.
(4) Generally, as explained in Overman, Redding and Venables (2001: 12) , market potentials can also be computed as: (5) where γ serves as a "distance weighting parameter". By varying the size of the distance weighting parameter, we obtain different measures of market potential:
Note that we would expect greater market potential to be (ceteris paribus) associated with higher exports.
Quantile regression model
6 Note that the market potential of country i at time t is calculated as the sum of the (inverse) bilateral distance weighted GDPs of all other countries and not only of all countries for which we analyse the effect of AfT on exports -which are, of course, mostly developing countries.
A novel specification we considered in this paper is the application of a quantile regression for panel data. Recently, Canay (2011) proposed a simple transformation to exclude fixed effects, assuming that these effects are location shifters. Canay proposes a two-step approach that consists of estimating country fixed effects (FE) using a within FE model in a first step. In a second step the consistently estimated FE are used to demean the dependent variable (log of exports) and this transformed variable is taken as a dependent variable in a quantile regression.
The model estimated in the first step is given by equation (3) above. Then the estimated α i are used to transform ln (Xit) into .
The quantile regression is estimated as,
Variables, Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we discuss the data and present variable descriptions and sources, as well as descriptive statistics. The panel dataset used in our empirical analysis covers the period from 2000 to 2011and comprises 162 countries (see Table A .1 in the Appendix). 7 Figure A .2 shows the regional distribution. It is worth noting that 19% of the countries are landlocked. Limited data availability influenced the time and country dimensions of the panel. Data coverage on
AfT-our key explanatory variable-for the years before 2000 is incomplete, and 2011 is the last year available. GE indicates the strength of governance performance. Finally, data on the strength of legal rights index (SOLR), which "measures the degree to which (...) laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending" (World Bank, 2013a), comes from the WDI database (World Bank, 2013a). The SOLR dataset is not part of our baseline model (see Section 2), but is used as an alternative to the government effectiveness (GE) index in some regressions. (C_TOTAL) and "total" AfT disbursements (D_TOTAL) are calculated as the sum of the proxies for commitments and disbursements, respectively. In what follows, we discuss the data of our AfT-proxies in detail. 9 Descriptive statistics for all other variables will be presented thereafter. First, note that the number of observations for
AfT commitments is significantly larger than for AfT disbursements (see Table 1 ). This is mostly due to the fact that data on disbursements is completely missing for the years before 2002 (e.g. in our case, for 2000 and for 2001).
Second, the average size of AfT commitments and disbursements is notable. The mean value of AfT commitments for economic infrastructure (C_EI), which is the average commitment on aid to economic infrastructure per country per year, is about US$ 124 million.
The fact that AfT is quite sizeable can best be seen when expressed relative to GDP. The ratio of the sum of all AfT proxies (C_TOTAL or D_TOTAL) to GDP has a median value of 1.4% for commitments and 1% for disbursements. The 75 th percentile is about 5% for commitments and 4% for disbursements. The largest AfT-to-GDP-ratio is actually larger than 1 for commitments (Kiribati, 2011) and larger than 0.5 for disbursements (Liberia, 2008) .
Third, AfT commitments tend to be larger and more volatile than AfT disbursements. As seen in Table 1 , mean commitments are strikingly larger than mean disbursements. The correlation coefficient between total commitments (C_TOTAL) and total disbursements (D_TOTAL) is "only" about 87% (p-value: 0.000). Figure 1 shows a scatter plot for C_TOTAL and D_TOTAL. The majority of observations (59%) lie well below the 45° line. The average shortfall of "total" disbursements below commitments amounts to US$ 67 million. This indicates that on average, donor countries do not fully match their commitments with actual disbursements. 10 Fourth, the distribution of AfT commitments (or disbursements) seems to be skewed to the right (positive skewness). While this cannot be seen in Table 1 , it can be inferred from the scatter plot in Figure 1 . The Figure shows many observations with relatively small AfT commitments, and few observations with high commitments. In other words, the mass of the distribution lies to the left. The skewness can also be seen in Figure 2 , which depicts a Kernel density function, an estimate of the density function for D_TOTAL for the year 2009. In Figure   2 , it is obvious that the estimated distribution is skewed to the right. The bulk of the countries receive relatively little AfT, while some countries receive significantly more. 11 Another way to illustrate this fact is to compute percentiles for the distribution of C_TOTAL and D_TOTAL, as done in Table A .4. While the median value of D_TOTAL is smaller than US$ 65 million, the 90 th percentile is almost ten times as large. 11 That "[AfT] (...) is relatively concentrated" is also discussed in OECD/ WTO (2011: 14) . The second part of Table 1 reports summary statistics on the dependent variable and control variables. It is worth noting here that the CPI (base year: 2005) ranges between 0.288 and 293318. The outliers belong to Zimbabwe, which recently experienced a period of hyperinflation (see, e.g., Hanke, 2008) . The outlier inflates the standard deviation and the mean, and is hence eliminated from the final regression. When excluding the observations for Zimbabwe, the mean (standard deviation) of the CPI drops from above 300 (7,800) to around 100 (25).
After having presented the empirical model in Section 2; and data, data sources and descriptive statistics in this section, we discuss the results of the regression analysis in the following section. In this section, we fit the model specified in Section 2 by using data for 162 countries over the period 2000 to 2011 (2002 to 2011 for AfT disbursements) and using several estimation techniques: (i) a (pooled) OLS regression with time fixed effects and regional dummy variables (as a benchmark), (ii) a fixed (or random) effects regression and (iii) a panel-quantile approach.
Main Results
The choice between using fixed or random effects ultimately depends on our assumption about the correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2001: 288) . We run a Hausman test in order to determine whether it is more appropriate to use fixed effects or random effects. The test results indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis (the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables), indicating that fixed effects should be used. 12 Table 2 reports the results of the regression analysis. When running the OLS regressions (OLS1 and OLS2), we include time and region fixed effects. In the fixed effects regressions (FE1 and FE2), time dummies are also included. We also perform some regression diagnostics.
For the OLS-regressions, the residuals are close to normal and homoscedastic. There is also no multicollinearity problem. In the fixed effects models, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation was present. Consequently, we use standard error estimates that are robust to these disturbances (Hoechle, 2007: 285) . We now discuss our results in some detail. (1) and (2). Coefficients for these dummies are not reported. Standard error estimates in columns (3) to (4) are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (see Hoechle, 2007: 285) . Time dummies are also included in columns (3) and (4).
In columns (1) and (2), we run OLS-regressions. In (1), we regress the log of exports of goods and services on the log of "total" AfT disbursements lagged by two years while controlling for Population size, the log of MP1, government effectiveness and the log of the CPI.
Year and region dummies are included. In (2), we make use of our four "defined" aid categories (three AfT categories and GBS) and regress the log of exports on the logs of aid disbursed to TPR, to EI, to BPC and to GBS (all lagged by two years) and on our baseline controls. In column (1), the coefficient of L2_ln_D_TOTAL-the log of "total" AfTdisbursements lagged by two years-is positive and statistically significant. Hence, the results of the (pooled) OLS regression suggest that larger "total" AfT disbursements are, ceteris paribus and on average, associated with higher exports of goods and services in the future. The coefficients of our lagged and logged AfT proxies in (2) are statistically significant and positive for aid disbursed to TPR and BPC; and negative for GBS (used for contrasting the results obtained for AfT). The coefficient of aid disbursed for GBS is statistically significant but has a negative sign, which is plausible when recipient countries do not stress trade development. The coefficients of our baseline controls in (1) and (2) have the expected signs except for the log of market potential (which has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient). The coefficients of Population and GE are statistically significant at the one percent level. To conclude, most coefficients-except for the coefficients of (logged and lagged) aid disbursed to GBS and the coefficient of (the log of) MP1-have the expected signs. "Total" AfTdisbursements, aid disbursed to TPR and aid disbursed to BPC seem to be effective. The effect of aid disbursed to EI cannot be distinguished from zero and aid disbursed to GBS may even be counter-productive. However, these findings should be taken with caution since we did not fully control for unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity in these regressions given that we use regional fixed effects but not country fixed effects.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 present the results obtained by estimating (country) fixed effects regressions. B of the logs of aid disbursed to PC, Population and of the CPI are statistically significant in all specifications in which they are included. In (3), the coefficient of total AfT disbursements is not statistically significant. A larger population and smaller CPI are, ceteris paribus and on average, associated with higher exports. The coefficients of GE and market potential are positive but insignificant. The main finding of (3) is that "total" AfT disbursements seem to be ineffective. In (4), only the coefficient of aid disbursed to BPC is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficients of all other AfT proxies cannot be distinguished from zero.
To conclude, the main finding of (4) is that aid disbursed to BPC is associated with higher future exports. Other AfT disbursements seem to be ineffective. We also experimented with alternative controls. We substituted the log of MP1 by the logs of MP2 and MP3, 18 respectively. The coefficient of market potential was positive and not statistically significant when using fixed effects irrespective of the size of the distance weighting parameter (see Section 2). The size of all other coefficients does not change much and the coefficient of GE stays statistically insignificant. Finally, we use SOLR instead of GE to control for institutional quality. This leaves all other coefficients almost unaffected. The coefficient of SOLR has a positive sign, as expected, but is statistically insignificant. Note that the coefficient of (the log of lagged) aid disbursed to BPC is positive and statistically significant, whereas the coefficients of all other AfT proxies cannot be distinguished from zero. Based on these results, it can be said that aid disbursed to PBC is effective. If aid disbursed to BPC increases by 100%, we would expect exports of goods and services to be about 5 percent higher two years later.
In short, the FE regression results indicate that "total" AfT disbursements are not effective because they are not associated with higher exports of goods and services in the future.
When controlling for country heterogeneity and using our three original AfT proxies, we find that aid disbursed to BPC is associated with higher future exports. Other AfT disbursements seem to be ineffective. These results are in line with those of Vijil and Wagner (2012) and Cali and Te Velde (2011) . It is notable that things do not change if we run the regressions shown with AfT disbursements lagged by one year instead of two years 13 . It could also be that the effectiveness of AfT depends on the level of exports. To investigate this hypothesis, in what follows, we present the results obtained when using quantile regressions. -0.006 0.000 0.007*** 0.006* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Population 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ln MP1 0.501*** 0.491*** 0.475*** 0.483*** (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) GE 0.041*** 0.021** -0.00100 -0.020* (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) ln CPI -0.025*** -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.0100 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) d2005 0.128*** 0.087*** 0.037*** -0.00400 (0 Our main findings can be summarised as follows. The regression results indicate that "total" AfT disbursements are effective only for higher levels of exports. For the 50 and 75 percentiles of the conditional distribution of exports, they are associated-ceteris paribus and on average-with higher exports of goods and services two years later (i.e. in the medium run). An increase of "total" AfT disbursements by 100% is associated with a 0.6% increase of exports of goods and services two years later (see Table 3 ). For the lower tail of the distribution of exports, the effect of "total" AfT disbursements cannot be distinguished from zero (see Table 3 ).
We also find that only specific types of AfT are effective. Aid disbursed to EI is associated with higher exports in the two upper quartiles. All other things equal, if aid disbursed to EI increases by 100%, we would expect exports of goods and services to be on average about 1% higher two years later (see Table 4 ). Also, aid given to enhance production capacity appears to be effective in the medium run (aid to TPR effectiveness decreases with the volume of exports), while aid disbursed to GBS does not promote export performance. -0.00600 -0.008*** -0.003 -0.002 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Population 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ln MP1 There are two issues concerning our empirical analysis that should be mentioned. First, in the regression analysis, we implicitly assumed that AfT is exogenous. However, it may well be that AfT is endogenous, i.e. that exports affect AfT ("reverse causality"). If this were the case, our analysis would be subject to an endogeneity problem and our estimates are likely to be biased or inconsistent. However, we mitigate the endogeneity problem by working with lagged values of AfT. Cali and Te Velde (2011) also came across an endogeneity problem, and employed instrumental variable estimators to overcome this issue. Controlling for endogeneity changes the size of the coefficients, but the main conclusion about AfT effectiveness does not change. Second, in our static model, we did not allow for any "dynamics". Cali and Te Velde (2011: 731) stress "exports are fairly persistent over time, as they tend to depend on previous exports." To deal with this issue, they test some dynamic specifications. We leave these extensions for further research.
Conclusion
It is widely recognized that one of the main objectives of AfT is to promote exports of goods and services. Given this aim, this paper investigates the extent to which AfT is effective in promoting trade. In particular, we analysed whether AfT and its different components are associated with higher exports of goods and services, quantify the effects and investigate whether these effects depend on the conditional distribution of exports.
We find that total AfT disbursements are only slightly effective at the upper tails of the distribution of exports (.50 and .75 quantiles), where they promote exports of goods and services in the medium run. All things equal, an increase of "total" AfT disbursements by 100% is associated on average with almost a 1% increase in exports two years later. However, "total"
AfT disbursements appear to have no impact on export performance on the lower tails of the distribution (.10 and .25 quantiles).
We also find that only specific types of AfT are effective. We find stronger evidence for the effectiveness of aid disbursed to building production capacity (BPC In conclusion, we find that on the one hand, and contrary to some studies (see, e.g., Cali
and Te Velde, 2011), aid disbursed to BPC is the only category of AfT that seems to be effective independently of the export amount. On the other hand, our results indicate that certain types of AfT are only effective in the upper tails of the export distribution, whereas others are not.
Further research should investigate the topic of AfT effectiveness in greater detail. To date, we know that some types of AfT are effective in promoting exports, whereas others are
not. An important question for further research will be to investigate the reasons for why some types of AfT are ineffective. Additionally, the relationship between AfT and a number of social outcomes (such as poverty rates) should also be investigated as increased trade is only a means to an end and not an end in itself. 
